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Biopolitics at the Bedside:  Proxy Wars and Feeding Tubes 
Joshua E. Perry1
Abstract 
In the aftermath of Terri Schiavo’s dramatic final weeks of life, George Annas 
speculated that proponents of “culture of life” politics might “now view [themselves] as 
strong enough to generate new laws . . . to require that incompetent patients be kept alive 
with artificially delivered fluids and nutrition.”  Indeed, Professor Annas’ prescience has 
been demonstrated by the post-Schiavo introduction in two dozen state legislatures of 
over fifty different bills making it more onerous to remove a patient’s artificial nutrition 
and hydration (ANH).  With minor exception, however, most of the proposed legislation 
has either stalled or been watered down, prompting columnist Ellen Goodman to ponder: 
“What if they gave a culture war and nobody came?”  With public opinion polls reporting 
large majorities in favor of Mrs. Schiavo’s right to cease ANH and in opposition to the 
government’s intervention in Mrs. Schiavo’s case, the failure of this legislative agenda is 
not surprising.  But Ms. Goodman’s query underestimates the power of what Alta Charo 
labels “proxy wars” waged by well-funded, opportunistic abortion opponents who seized 
on the Schiavo case as an opportunity “to rehearse arguments on the value of biologic but 
nonsentient human existence.”  Appropriating Professor Charo’s notion of “proxy wars” 
and various critical theorists’ concept of biopolitics—that political power which Foucault 
labeled “the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die”—this paper explores the post-Schiavo 
political-legal environment and the surge in ANH-related legislation as evidence of what 
Nancy Neveloff Dubler has termed “a new era of politicized and polarized death.”   
 
Introduction 
 
In the introductory essay to the June 2006 issue of the Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, Jeffrey P. Bishop and Fabrice Jotterand note that “bioethics has always been 
a biopolitics and the political dimension is only now coming into relief for bioethicists.”2
Writing in the May-June 2006 issue of the Hastings Center Report, Jeff Kahn echoes this 
sentiment when he comments that “[b]ioethics has always been involved in policy issues 
and the politics surrounding them.”3 So despite a history of political intersections, why 
 
1 Assistant Professor, Center for Biomedical Ethics & Society, Vanderbilt University.  I am grateful for 
comments, critique, and encouragement I received from Joseph Fanning, Jon Eisenberg, Larry Churchill, 
and Ellen Wright Clayton.  
2 Jeffrey P. Bishop & Fabrice Jotterand, Bioethics as Biopolitics, 31 JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND 
PHILOSOPHY 205, 205 (2006). 
3 Jeffrey P. Kahn, What Happens When Politics Discovers Bioethics?, 36 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 3:10 
(May-June 2006). 
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has bioethics and its entanglement with politics only recently arrested the attention of so 
many commentators?4
One compelling answer suggested by Jonathan Moreno, Art Caplan and Alta 
Charo focuses on the event of the President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB).5 In the wake 
of a bitterly contested electoral process that gave rise to an acerbically partisan polity, 
President Bush announced the creation of the PCB in August 2001, during the same 
speech (his first primetime address to the nation) in which he proclaimed his position on 
cloning research and his decision regarding federal funding of embryonic stem cell 
research.  Birthed in what Leon Kass terms “embryoville” and labeled by many as the 
“stem cell council,” the PCB has never successfully distanced itself from highly political 
subject matter.6 Indeed, despite former chairman Kass’s protestations to the contrary, 
evidence suggests that the PCB itself has incorporated politics into its work to an 
unprecedented degree with “a concerted effort to promote a particular political 
philosophy” through both “its membership and its staffing.”7
4 For a sampling of the recent literature discussing bioethics and politics, see generally Ruth Macklin, The 
New Conservatives in Bioethics: Who Are They and What Do They Seek? 36 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 
1:34-43 (Jan.-Feb. 2006); Eric Cohen, Conservative Bioethics & the Search for Wisdom, 36 HASTINGS 
CENTER REPORT 1:44-56 (Jan.-Feb. 2006); Leon R. Kass, Reflections on Public Bioethics: A View from the 
Trenches, 15 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL 221-250 (2005); Madison Powers, Bioethics as 
Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise, 15 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL 305-322 (2005); R. 
Alta Charo, Realbioethik, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 4:13-14 (July-Aug. 2005); Arthur Caplan, “Who 
Lost China?” A Foreshadowing of Today’s Ideological Disputes in Bioethics, 35 HASTINGS CENTER 
REPORT 3:12-13 (May-June 2005); Jonathan D. Moreno, The End of the Great Bioethics Compromise, 35 
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1:14-15 (Jan.-Feb. 2005); R. Alta Charo, Passing on the Right: Conservative 
Bioethics is Closer Than It Appears, 32 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 307 (2004); Leigh Turner, 
Science, Politics and the President’s Council on Bioethics, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 509-510 (2004); 
Yuval Levin, The Paradox of Conservative Bioethics, 1 THE NEW ATLANTIS 53-65 (2003). 
5 Caplan, “Who Lost China?” at 12; Moreno, The End at 15; Charo, Passing on the Right at 307. 
6 Kass, Reflections on Public Bioethics, at 223. 
7 Charo, Passing on the Right at 308.  But see Kass, Reflections on Public Bioethics at 225-226 (“The 
Council is, by design, in every respect a diverse and heterogeneous group.  By training we are scientists and 
physicians, lawyers and social scientists, humanists and theologians; by political leaning we are liberals and 
conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, and independents; and by religion we are Protestants, Catholics, 
Jews, and perhaps some who are none of the above. . . . I hasten to add that there were no political or 
ideological litmus tests for appointment to the Council, not the first time around, and not at the start of our 
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I find the PCB thesis to be largely correct in helping to explain the most recent 
manifestation of bioethics’ politicization.  The PCB thesis, however, fails to explain fully 
this “new era of politicized and polarized death.”8 In an attempt to understand better the 
recent fusion of politics and feeding tubes at the end of life, this paper develops an 
additional explanation—the “proxy war”9 thesis, which is slightly different although 
certainly related to the political shadows cast by the PCB.  In short, the proxy war thesis 
is rooted in “a new political and moral agenda that sees the ‘right to life’ as applying both 
to the beginning and to the end of existence” and envisions a culture of control over the 
bodies of individual citizens.10 
This paper begins with a discussion of biopolitics—that political power which 
Foucault labeled “the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die” and an exploration of how 
various applications and mutations of this political concept help shed light on the tensions 
between power, regulation, individual autonomy, and the common good in the context of 
death and dying.11 As documented in Part II, these tensions have been concretely 
realized in the widespread introduction of post-Schiavo legislation designed to make it 
 
second term.  Of the original 18 members, probably seven or eight did not vote for President Bush, and no 
one asked.  Nor was there ever any litmus test on the embryo questions.  It is time to put to rest the libel 
that the Council is a hyper-politicized group of right-wing fundamentalists, seeking to impose pro-life 
views on the nation or willing to ignore scientific facts in the name of religious ideology.”) 
8 Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Conflict and Consensus at the End of Life, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT (SPECIAL 
REPORT: IMPROVING END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT BEEN SO DIFFICULT?), S19, S23 (2005) (emphasis 
added). “The Schiavo case reflects the fact that death is the new arena for self-serving professional and 
partisan preening and for potential political gain. . . . Unfortunately, as the Schiavo case demonstrated, 
death may be good politics.”  Id. at S20. 
9 R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2471, 2471-73 (2005). 
10 Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Conflict and Consensus at the End of Life, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT (SPECIAL 
REPORT: IMPROVING END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT BEEN SO DIFFICULT?), S19, S19 (2005). I am 
indebted to Larry Churchill for the clever “culture of control” phraseology.  
11 MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975-76 
[LECTURES], at 241 (David Macey trans., Mauro Bertani et al. eds., Picador 2003). 
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more onerous to remove a patient’s artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).12 With large 
majorities continuing to oppose the government’s intervention in Mrs. Schiavo’s 
situation, it is perhaps not surprising that the vast majority of these proposals have not 
(yet) succeeded in altering the legal landscape.13 Nonetheless, I argue that it is a mistake 
to dismiss or to ignore these political overtures.14 
Rather, as introduced above and discussed in Part III, biopolitical theory helps 
crystallize the conversation and provides a framework for discussing the power of what 
Alta Charo labels “proxy wars.”15 The proxy war thesis best explains why well-funded, 
opportunistic abortion opponents seized on the Schiavo case as an opportunity to 
“rehearse arguments on the value of biologic but nonsentient human existence,” while 
they moved beyond the political scope of neonates to consider neomorts.16 In other 
words, this paper attempts to provide help answering the puzzling question:  Why has the 
beginning-of-life-obsessed anti-abortion movement seized on the issue of end-of-life 
feeding tubes?  Ultimately, this paper concludes that biopolitics in our early 21st century 
United States context is about the strategies and agendas for controlling and regulating 
the bodies of individuals even at the bedside as they lay dying.  Politicized interventions 
that seek to control and to regulate the personal and private space of one’s final exit—in 
 
12 Observing the unprecedented drama surrounding Terri Schiavo’s final weeks of life, George Annas had 
speculated that proponents of “culture of life” politics might “now view [themselves] as strong enough to 
generate new laws . . . to require that incompetent patients be kept alive with artificially delivered fluids 
and nutrition.”  See George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside—The Case of Terri Schiavo,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1710-15 (2005). 
13 See generally Gary Langer, Poll:  No Role for Government in Schiavo Case, ABCNEWS.GO.COM, Mar. 21, 
2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=599622&page=1.  Accord Dalia 
Sussman, More Than Six in 10 Still Support Decision in Schiavo Case, ABCNEWS.GO.COM, Mar. 27, 2006, 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/PollVault/story?id=1771492. 
14 See Ellen Goodman, Schiavo Debate is Back But Life’s Moved On, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2006, 
at A15 (“What if they gave a culture war and nobody came?”). 
15 R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2471, 2471-73 (2005). 
16 Id. Neomorts are defined as humans that have permanently lost consciousness but still have functioning 
bodies.  See Willard Gaylin, Harvesting the Dead, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 23, 1974, at 23-30. 
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an effort to promote the “culture of life” cliché—must be identified and resisted as abuses 
of a biopolitical power that threatens individual decision-making at the end of life.   
Part I    
A. The birth of biopolitics 
In the mid-1970s, while teaching at the Collège de France and writing in The 
History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault introduced the concept of biopower.  Foucault 
argued that biopower “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit 
calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human life.”17 
This transformation of human life resulted in the capitalistic modern state, which 
Foucault insisted was made possible by pre-existing institutional mechanisms and 
disciplinary technologies of biopower, i.e., “the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes.”18 The rise of contemporary Western society, therefore, was fueled by the 
development of this biopower phenomenon; a phenomenon that Foucault describes as the 
rise of state power over all “living things”—the power to regulate, discipline and take 
control of life and life processes.  In contrast to the classical sovereign’s “right to take life 
or let live,” the modern state now wields a more expansive “right to make live or to let 
die.”19 
According to Foucault, the era of biopower emerged during the eighteenth century 
as a result of the explosion of various disciplines and regulatory regimes designed to 
 
17 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION [SEXUALITY] 143 
(Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books 1978).  For a helpful discussion of biopower and biopolitics, see 
Paul Rabinow, Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT READER 3, 12-23 (Paul Rabinow, ed., Pantheon Books, 
1984). 
18 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 140-41. 
19 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 136. See also FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 241.  The sovereign’s right to take life 
and let live is symbolized by the sword.  The state’s right to make live or let die is expressed, most 
frequently, in far more complex and complicated bureaucratic regulatory schemes.   
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subjugate individual bodies and to control burgeoning populations.  Thus, the state’s 
exercise of control and power over life and death operated along two trajectories, taking 
the forms of anatomo-politics (of the human body) and bio-politics (of the population).20 
In Foucault’s account, anatomopolitics centered on the individual body as a machine to 
be disciplined, trained, optimized and integrated into efficient systems of economic 
control and state sustainability.21 Biopolitics, on the other hand, referred to the state’s 
regulatory control over the population as a whole— the “species body, the body imbued 
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes,” i.e., the 
ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of the population, the level 
of health, and life expectancy and longevity.22 Thus as armies, schools, prisons, hospitals 
and workshops rapidly developed, so too did attendant “problems of birth rate, longevity, 
public health, housing, and migration,” and the subject of the state’s mechanisms and 
calculations of power, increasingly, became the life (and death) of its citizenry, not as 
specific individuals, but as a population.23 
Foucault claimed that “[b]iopolitics deals with the population, with the population 
as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological 
 
20 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 139. 
21 See generally Michel Foucault, The Political Technology of Individuals, in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF:
A SEMINAR WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 152 (Luther H. Martin, et al. eds., Univ. of Mass. Press 1988) 
([G]overnment has to worry about [individual citizens] only insofar as they are somehow relevant for the 
reinforcement of the state’s strength:  what they do, their life, their death, their activity, their individual 
behavior, their work, and so on . . . [S]ometimes what [the citizen] has to do for the state is to live, to work, 
to produce, to consume; and sometimes what he has to do is to die.”). 
22 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 139. See also FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 243. 
23 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 140.  See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER 
AND BARE LIFE [“HOMO SACER”] 119-135 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998).  
Agamben notes that the integration of medicine and politics is one of the essential characteristics of modern 
biopolitics.  This integration can be observed most clearly in the physicians Karl Brand and Viktor Brack, 
who were sentenced to death at Nuremberg for their complicity in the Nazi euthanasia program. Id. at 143.  
“[I]n the biopolitical horizon that characterizes modernity, the physician and the scientist move in the no-
man’s-land into which at one point the sovereign alone could penetrate.”  Id. at 159. 
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problem and as power’s problem.”24 Furthermore, with “the emergence of this 
technology of power over ‘the’ population as such, over men insofar as they are living 
beings . . . we have the emergence of a power that [Foucault called] the power of 
regularization.”25 Therefore, biopolitics as developed by Foucault is a political power of 
regulation and control that intervenes at a level of social generality where it can lower the 
mortality rate, raise life expectancy and stimulate the birth rate throughout the population 
at large.26 
The harnessing and exercising of this biopower, however, requires continuous 
regulatory and administrative mechanisms, and, thus, creates a political tension that is 
inextricably woven into the fabric of modern, liberal democratic societies and the 
administrative apparatus that supports them.27 “And most important of all, regulatory 
mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, 
establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general 
population and its aleatory field.”28 The state’s exercise of biopower to compel 
conformity and its tendency to oppress and to alienate results in political struggles and 
strategies that manifest in culture wars over one’s “right” to life (and to death), to health, 
to happiness, to one’s body, and “to rediscover what one is and all that one can be.”29 
24 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 245. 
25 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 247. 
26 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 244. 
27 Indeed, as Foucault notes, “[f]or millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle:  a living animal 
with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his 
existence as a living being into question.”  FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 143.   
28 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 246. 
29 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 145. At this point, Foucault leaves his background discussion of bio-power 
and bio-politics, and moves forward with his discussion of sex as a political issue.  It is worth mentioning 
that he also includes in his litany the right “to rediscover what one is and all that one can be.”  Id. For an 
extended reflection on what it means to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, i.e., the experience 
of self-fulfillment, in the context of contemporary social, political, and legal attitudes towards sex, see 
Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1, 13-34 (2005). 
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Alas, as the American experiment enters the 21st century, we see increasing 
debate about what constitutes the optimized state of life.  Some of that debate, the portion 
relevant to artificial nutrition and hydration, will be addressed later in this paper.  Indeed, 
we see increasing attempts by the state to control the biological beginnings and endings 
of life, even as individuals attempt to assert claims to autonomy and rights to self-
determination.  Thus, bioethics inevitably births biopolitics, as contemporary issues of 
life and death trigger power dynamics between individuals, an administratively-
bureaucratized state, and a conservative ideological movement which seeks to regulate 
the culture via legislation advancing its version of the common good.30 
B.  Biopolitical theory applied 
Since its introduction in the mid-1970s, the concept of biopower and biopolitics 
has been developed and advanced by several theorists across an array of disciplines.  
Following Foucault, scholars have expanded the utility of these concepts by applying 
them to both macro and micro bioethical issues of our day.  Before moving to our 
examination of post-Schiavo feeding tube legislation and the notion of proxy wars, it may 
be helpful to spend a few moments briefly considering the diversity of applications and 
analyses offered by biopolitical theory.  
1.  Reproduction 
Anthropologist Paul Rabinow and sociologist Nikolas Rose describe “biopower” 
as “rationalized attempts to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence.”31 
More precisely, they define “biopolitics” as “all the specific strategies and contestations 
 
30 I say much more about this conservative ideological movement, i.e., the Religious Right, and the 
phenomena of Bibiblical BioPolitics in Joshua E. Perry, Biblical BioPolitics: Judicial Process, Religious 
Rhetoric, Terri Schiavo and Beyond [Biblical BioPolitics], 16 HEALTH MATRIX 2:553-650 (2006).  
31 Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose, Biopower Today, 1 BIOSOCIETIES 195-217, 197 (2006). 
© Joshua E. Perry   July 2006 Draft     9
over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality; over the 
forms of knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of intervention that are desirable, 
legitimate and efficacious.”32 As with Foucault, biopolitics as formulated by these 
scholars becomes an analytical concept with considerable critical force.33 In their most 
recent article, Profs. Rabinow and Rose focus upon reproduction as “a problem space, in 
which an array of connections appear between the individual and the collective, the 
technological and the political, the legal and the ethical.”34 As an aid to our 
understanding of biopolitics as a concept, we will briefly review their discussion of this 
“biopolitical space par excellence.”35 
Rabinow and Rose note that current public policy determinations are marked by 
“new modes of individualization and conceptions of autonomy with their associated 
rights to health, life, liberty and the pursuit of a form of happiness.”36 For instance, new 
reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis, harmonize well with both “the rhetoric of choice” and “the ethic of 
autonomy.”37 However, Rabinow and Rose argue that these developments are limited in 
their impact upon the population at large because their use is neither routine nor 
guaranteed to succeed.  For instance, the authors note that reproductive choice in the form 
of embryo selection “has been almost entirely limited to the identification of fetuses with 
 
32 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 197.  
33 Profs. Rabinow and Rose argue that biopolitics must be grounded in historical or genealogical analysis, 
as opposed to a meta- or trans-historical theory that might attempt to “describe everything but analyse 
nothing.”  Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 199. 
34 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 208.  In addition to issues related to reproduction, Profs. Rabinow 
and Rose also discuss race and genomic medicine in this article.  Id. at 205ff, 212ff. 
35 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 208. 
36 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 204. 
37 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 208. 
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major malformations or crippling and terminal genetic disorders”—not the eugenically-
inspired “improvement of the biological stock of the population.”38 
At the more macro level, however, contemporary biopolitical strategies can be 
observed in the management of reproduction in the form of campaigns throughout Asia 
and Latin America to limit population growth.39 On this point, Rabinow and Rose 
highlight China’s One Child Policy and various sterilization campaigns around the world.  
Noting the controversial nature of these policies, the authors again stress the distinction 
between limiting population in the interests of national economic prosperity and the 
eugenic “purification of the race by elimination of degenerates.”40 In a less repugnant 
category, state-sanctioned policies to reduce “the levels of inherited morbidity and 
pathology in a population” are often sanctioned by religious and secular authorities and 
approved by the population.41 Examples of this more acceptable impact on the 
“individual reproductive choices of each citizen” include systematic and nationwide 
testing to identify and control the genetic dissemination of cystic fibrosis or Tay Sachs.42 
The authors’ point in discussing reproduction as a biopolitical issue is to highlight 
the idea that genetic testing and population controls are not necessarily leading us down 
the road to eugenics or genocide.  On the contrary, they assert that the thrust of 
“contemporary biopolitics in the realm of reproduction” is geared more towards 
vitality—not mortality.43 Thus, these authors caution against leaping to unwarranted 
 
38 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 208, 210.  Although only recently published, the authors were 
originally writing in August 2003.  Since then, developments suggest that selection along other criteria is 
not too far in the future, and fears concerning slippery slopes may not be completely unfounded.  See Beezy 
Marsh, “Designer Baby” Clinic to Charge £6,000 Per Child, NEWS TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Mar. 26, 2006. 
39 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 209. 
40 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 210. 
41 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 210. 
42 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 210. 
43 Indeed, “letting die is not making die.”  Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 211 (emphasis in original). 
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conclusions that recall past atrocities and unnecessarily raise latent fears and anxieties—
particularly among vulnerable populations.44 While a comprehensive review of the 
authors’ complete argument is not relevant to the purpose of this paper, we can quickly 
surmise from this brief review that social and political governance of life, death, and 
technologies are constitutive elements of the contemporary biopolitics.           
 2. Palliative Care, Death & Dying 
Of particular value to our discussion is a recent contribution to the literature from 
legal scholar John Parry, who has applied a biopolitical analysis to constitutional law and 
the use of governmental power to regulate pain and to manage death.45 Parry’s work in 
this area focuses primarily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Raich.46 The 
facts in the Gonzales case are not complex.  In 1996 California passed the Compassionate 
Use Act creating a system by which “seriously ill” California residents (and their primary 
caregiver) could legally possess or cultivate marijuana for medicinal purposes with the 
 
44 In Part II, I discuss the National Right to Life Committee’s Model Act, which, I would suggest, 
intentionally uses the misleading and alarming title:  “The Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with 
Disabilities Prevention Act.”  For additional analysis on the use of rhetoric as a biopolitical strategy, see 
Perry, Biblical BioPolitics. Ruth Macklin has also noted the use by some bioethical commentators of 
“metaphors and slogans as substitutes for empirical evidence and reasoned arguments; patently offensive 
analogies; [and] deliberately misleading terminology.”  The New Conservatives in Bioethics: Who Are They 
and What Do They Seek? 36 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1:34, 38 (Jan. – Feb. 2006). 
45 John T. Parry, “Society Must Be [Regulated]”: Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzalez v. 
Raich [“Society”], 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 853, 863-77 (2005).  Professor Parry is one of the few 
American legal scholars who has addressed the notion of biopolitics.  A sampling of others scholars in the 
legal academy or publishing in the law literature who have written recently on biopolitics or biopower 
include: Peter Fitzpatrick, Homo Sacer and the Insistence of Law, in POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH:
ESSAYS ON GIORGIO AGAMBEN’S HOMO SACER [POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, & DEATH] (Andrew Norris ed., 
Duke University Press 2005); Adam Thurschwell, Cutting the Branches for Akiba:  Agamben’s Critique of 
Derrida in POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, & DEATH; Craig Willse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory 
State?:  Lawrence, Marriage and Biopolitics, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 309 (2005); Austin Sarat & Nassar 
Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness:  George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004); Mariella Pandolfi, Contract of Mutual (In)Difference:  Governance and the 
Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 369 (2003); 
Adam Thurschwell, Specters of Nietzsche: Potential Futures for the Concept of the Political in Agamben 
and Derrida, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193 (2003); and Eugene MacNamee, The Government of the Tongue,
14 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 427 (2002). 
46 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
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approval or recommendation of a physician.47 Angel Raich and Diane Monson, 
California residents suffering from a variety of serious health afflictions, relied heavily 
on daily cannabis treatments in order to function.48 They were both under the care and 
supervision of licensed, board-certified family practitioners, who were convinced that 
marijuana was the only drug available that could provide effective treatment.49 In August 
2002 federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)—pursuant to the federal Controlled 
Substances Act—came to Monson’s home, where they seized and destroyed all six of her 
cannabis plants.50 
When the case reached the Supreme Court it was framed as a question of whether 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances includes markets 
that are supplied with drugs that are locally grown and consumed.51 The Court, in a 6-3 
decision, held that Congress does have the power to regulate purely local activities that 
are part of an economic class of activities, i.e., the production, cultivation, distribution, 
possession, or consumption of a commodity that may have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce or the regulation of interstate commerce.  The scope of this federal 
regulatory authority, according to the Court, reaches even those who use homegrown 
medicinal marijuana in accordance with the laws of their state.       
While on the surface the Raich case raises complicated questions of federalism, 
Professor Parry instead concentrates his focus on the deeper currents of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, namely the “broad idea and endorsement of comprehensive regulatory 
power, be it federal (through the Commerce Clause) or state (through the so-called police 
 
47 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 11362.5-11362.9 (West Supp. 2006). 
48 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-2200.  
49 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200. 
50 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.  See also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. 
51 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201. 
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power).”52 Parry notes that “at least eight of the justices agreed in Raich on the 
constitutional principle that one of the proper concerns of government is to regulate 
aggregate public health, which in turn means controlling the individual bodies of citizens 
as units of the larger public.”53 It is this aspect of Raich—“its easy approval of 
comprehensive and pervasive biopolitical regulation”—that triggers Parry’s ominous 
comment regarding the grave implications of this regulatory action: 
[T]he issue in Raich was the provision of marijuana to seriously ill people 
for the purpose of alleviating their pain.  The power “to make live and let 
die” is neither a metaphor nor a theoretical frolic.  Biopolitical regulation 
of populations is concrete—individuals will live or die or will suffer more 
or less pain as a result of it.54 
Parry’s discussion of Raich, like the Court’s opinion, does not address the substantive 
questions swirling around the legitimacy of medicinal marijuana and the boundaries of 
appropriate pain management and palliative care.  Rather, Parry’s focus is on the reality 
of biopolitical regulation in the modern administrative state and the challenge this 
presents to individual interests.   
For illustrative purposes, Parry also includes a brief discussion of the right to obtain 
an abortion—“a medical procedure every aspect of which is heavily regulated.”55 A
woman seeking to exercise her right to terminate her pregnancy must navigate through an 
elaborate series of regulatory hurdles each allegedly premised on the state’s interest in 
protecting her health.  Paradoxically, however, a woman desiring to assert her legal right 
to control her body is not freed from the confines of the regulatory state; she is only 
 
52 Parry, “Society”, at 863. 
53 Parry, “Society”, at 868.   
54 Parry, “Society”, at 868. 
55 Parry, “Society”, at 871. 
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enmeshed in it all the more.56 Parry grants that some manner of regulation is in the best 
interest of the woman’s health.  Yet, the politicized nature of much of the regulation, i.e., 
the required reading material discussing fetal development, is, for many, a more 
problematic ideologically-driven expression of biopolitics. 
Parry’s final application of biopolitical theory focuses on the regulation of end of 
life decisions.  In a comment that triggers images of Karen Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and 
Terri Schiavo, Parry remarks:  
Death is no longer something that just happens.  Rather it is a process, 
planned in advance and monitored and controlled by lawyers, doctors, 
family members, legislatures, government officials, and the person who is 
dying.  It is the concern, in short, of biopolitics.57 
As this quote suggests, biopolitics highlights the strategic relationships between 
government actors, the affected individuals in the population, and participants in the 
political economy.58 Indeed, during the latter half of the twentieth century, a range of 
powerful regulatory agencies, transnational bodies, bioethics commissions, and 
professional organizations emerged to create a type of “bioethical complex.”59 
Moreover, “the increasing medicalization, bureaucratizing, and politicization of death” 
creates predictable conflicts as individuals suffer encroachments upon their body, their 
life, and their death.60 Sure, “[i]ndividuals can make their own choices through such 
things as living wills, but preparing, recognizing, and implementing a living will are not 
 
56 Parry, “Society”, at 872. 
57 Parry, “Society”, at 873. 
58 See Maurizio Lazzarato, From Biopower to Biopolitics, 13 THE WARWICK JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 100-
111 (2002) (Ivan A. Ramirez, trans.) (“The fundamental political problem of modernity is not that of a 
single source of sovereign power, but that of a multitude of forces that act and react amongst each other 
according to relations of command and obedience.”).  Lazzarato illustrates his point by noting that relations 
between the sexes, student and teacher, patient and doctor, employee and employer are all “relations 
between forces that always involve a power relation.”  Id. at 104. 
59 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 203. 
60 Parry, “Society”, at 873. 
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exceptions to state control.  Rather, they are processes that are approved and regulated by 
the state for our benefit.”61 Thus, similar to abortion, an individual’s desires regarding 
what should or should not happen to her body are, in our biopolitical age, increasingly 
subject to the highly political processes of state regulation, including the ideological 
influence of special interest organizations.        
These processes, regrettably, were most recently on parade during the Terri 
Schiavo saga62—an event that presented a wavering indeterminacy of death “in a 
shadowy zone beyond coma” and “an analogous oscillation between medicine and law, 
medical decision and legal decision.63 In the Schiavo case, we witnessed a political and 
legal fight over the biological body of Terri Schiavo—a body that had, in fact, “entered a 
zone of indetermination in which the words ‘life’ and ‘death’ had lost their meaning.”64 
At stake in this biopolitical conflict was Mrs. Schiavo’s sovereignty over her own 
existence.  Her life (and death) became politicized as her husband attempted to exercise 
her right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).  Her husband’s attempts, 
however, only served to legitimate the biopolitical boundaries of state action, as 
Agamben explains:  “[T]he rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central 
powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ 
lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very 
sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves.”65 Thus, as Parry notes, 
rights serve both to distinguish us from those outside the political community while 
 
61 Parry, “Society”, at 873. 
62 For a detailed account of the Schiavo saga, see Perry, Biblical BioPolitics.
63 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE [“HOMO SACER”] 163 (Daniel 
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (describing Karen Quinlan). 
64 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 164 (describing Karen Quinlan’s body). 
65 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 121. 
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simultaneously marking us as members of a regulated community.66 “In this sense, rights 
are part of biopolitics—or, rather, rights discourse and biopolitics are both aspects of 
what it means to live [and die] in a modern society.”67 
So Terri Schiavo’s life and death present us with a thoroughly modern continuum.  
Without heroic medical interventions and continuing ANH via a surgically implanted 
feeding tube, Mrs. Schiavo’s body would have ceased functioning long before the final 
court order which ended the saga that had begun fifteen years earlier with Mrs. Schiavo’s 
still-unexplained collapse.  As Foucault notes, “we have become so good at keeping 
people alive that we’ve succeeded in keeping them alive when, in biological terms, they 
should have been dead long ago.”68 Indeed, Mrs. Schiavo was sustained for fifteen years 
by a medico-juridico-political power that intervened to make her live for many years and, 
ultimately, at the end, managed her death.69 
During those fifteen years her life was reduced to biological life—“anatomy in 
motion”—“death in motion,” a set of functions whose purpose was “no longer the life of 
an organism.”70 Maintained only with the assistance of life-support technology, Mrs. 
 
66 Parry, “Society”, at 872.  See also AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 131 (“One of the essential characteristics 
of modern biopolitics . . . is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and 
separates what is inside from what is outside. . . . And when natural life is wholly included in the polis . . . 
these thresholds pass . . . beyond the dark boundaries separating life from death in order to identify a new 
living dead man, a new sacred man.”). 
67 Parry, “Society”, at 872. 
68 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 244. 
69 Professor Parry explains: 
However one chooses to characterize the Schiavo controversy, it is clear that there was 
nothing “natural” about it.  After her injury, she could only exist—and could only die—
within a matrix of pervasive and invasive legal and medical regulation.  Indeed, to die, 
she would have to be killed, if only in the sense that medical professionals would take 
deliberate actions with the knowledge that those actions would lead to (and arguably 
“cause”) her death. . . . With the Schiavo case, and by implication with the thousands or 
more of managed deaths that take place every year, there was no baseline outside 
biopolitics, no way for “nature to take its course.” 
Parry, “Society”, at 874-75. 
70 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 186 (“[S]ince life and death are now merely biological concepts, as we have 
seen, Karen Quinlan’s body—which wavers between life and death according the progress of medicine and 
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Schiavo’s life was sustained by virtue of legal decisions.71 Indeed, the Schiavo saga 
demonstrated that “we are not only, in Foucault’s words, animals whose life as living 
beings is at issue in their politics, but also—inversely—citizens whose very politics is at 
issue in their natural body.”72 
Part II. Post-Schiavo ANH legislation 
 In October 2003, following Florida’s passage of Terri’s Law, the legislation 
granting Governor Jeb Bush the unilateral power to re-insert Mrs. Schiavo’s feeding tube, 
the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) published a model “Starvation and 
Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act” (the Model Act) and called for 
its adoption in all fifty states.73 With the exception of Florida, states were slow to answer 
the NRLC’s call.74 Approximately fifteen months later, however, as the Terri Schiavo 
 
the changes in legal decisions—is a legal being as much as it is a biological being.  A law that seeks to 
decide on life is embodied in a life that coincides with death.”). 
71 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 186. 
72 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 188.  See generally Andrew Norris, Introduction:  Giorgio Agamben and the 
Politics of the Living Dead, in POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH: ESSAYS ON GIORGIO AGAMBEN’S
HOMO SACER [POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, & DEATH] 2 (Andrew Norris ed., Duke University Press 2005) 
(“For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle:  a living animal with the additional capacity for 
political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into 
question.”  FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, at 143).  See also AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 4 (“[T]he entry of zoA
into the sphere of the polis—the politicization of bare life as such—constitutes the decisive event of 
modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical 
thought.”). 
73 Wes Allison, New Life for the Right-to-Life Movement, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (FLORIDA), Oct. 25, 
2003, at A1.  The NRLC’s executive director explained: “We must not let the horror and outrage over the 
attempted starvation and dehydration of Terri Schindler-Schiavo dwindle and die away before we have 
acted to secure protection for the thousands facing a similar fate.”  Press Release, National Right to Life, 
Spurred By Schindler-Schiavo Case, Model State Law to Prevent Starvation and Dehydration Proposed 
(Oct. 2003) (on file with author).       
74 On November 21, 2003, Florida became the first state to consider this model legislation.  See S.B. 692, 
2004 Leg., 106th Sess. (Fl. 2004).  However, on January 14, 2004, the model legislation was introduced in 
Georgia.  See H.B. 1132, 2003-04 Gen. Assem., 147th Sess. (Ga. 2004).  Less than two weeks later, 
similar, although not identical, legislation was introduced in South Dakota.  See S.B. 187, 2004 Leg., 79th 
Sess. (S.D. 2004). 
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case began to capture the nation’s attention, a wave of Schiavo-inspired legislation began 
to form, guided by the NRLC and its local state affiliates.75 
By January 2005, as media attention surrounding the Schiavo case intensified, 
state legislators started to take notice, and by June 2006, fifty-five bills or resolutions had 
been filed in twenty-four different states.76 The vast majority (if not all) of this 
legislation was introduced in reaction to Mrs. Schiavo’s tragedy.  Consider the following 
comments from sponsoring legislators: 
“This bill is a direct result of the Terry [sic] Schiavo case.  Ms. Schiavo 
was starved and dehydrated to death under extremely dubious 
circumstances.  It was a travesty of justice . . . that she should literally be 
‘put to death.’”—John E. Rooney, New Jersey State Assemblyman77 
“The reason for proposing this legislation was in the wake of Terry [sic] 
Schiavo dying from lack of hydration and nutrition. . . . The intent of this 
legislation is that if a family is in disagreement . . . then the decision will 
be to err on the side of life.”—John Stahl, Michigan State Representative78 
“After the Terri Schiavo tragedy, [I discovered] that New York State does 
not have any laws to protect human rights in instances such as the Schiavo 
case.  That was the purpose in proposing these two pieces of legislation:  
 
75 Additionally, disability advocates, including most notably Not Dead Yet, have also been prominent and 
vocal supporters of much post-Schiavo legislation.  Their activism on this issue, however, is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
76 The twenty-four states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.  For a listing of bill 
numbers and a detailed description of the legislation, see the thorough research of Elena N. Cohen and 
Theresa Connor, assisted by Kathy Cerminara and Kathryn Tucker, prepared for MergerWatch as a 
“Summary of State Bills Restricting End-of-Life Choices Introduced in 2005 and 2006” available at 
http://www.mergerwatch.org/press_releases.html.  This extremely helpful research was current as of 
February 2006.  Not reflected in this data are the following bills that were introduced between February and 
June 2006: Alabama SB493; California SB1280; Georgia SR1067; Oklahoma SB1624; and, Tennessee 
HB2726, SB2749.  The MergerWatch Project is a nonprofit organization “committed to fighting the spread 
of faith-based policies and restrictions in the American health system.”  See “Mission” available at 
www.mergerwatch.org. 
77 E-mail from John E. Rooney, Assemblyman, New Jersey Legislative District 39, to Joshua E. Perry (June 
9, 2006) (on file with author).  Assemblyman Rooney was responding to an inquiry about why he proposed 
Assembly Bill 2117, “The Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act.” 
78 E-mail from John Stahl, Representative, Michigan Legislative District 82, to Joshua E. Perry (June 12, 
2006) (on file with author).  Representative Stahl was responding to an inquiry about why proposed House 
Bill 4743, a bill that would prohibit the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition or hydration under certain 
circumstances. 
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to protect human rights and avoid the tragic outcome that befell Terri 
Schiavo.”—Daniel L. Hooker, New York State Assemblyman79 
“Senator Morrow authored this legislation to prevent what happened to 
Terri Schiavo here in California. . . . [I]f a person has not clearly expressed 
their wishes for a particular circumstance, the state and the person’s 
protectors should err on the side of life and give them basic rights:  foods 
and fluids. . . . [Otherwise,] it becomes essentially starving/dehydrating a 
person to death, rather than simply ‘allowing’ someone’s illness to take its 
natural course. . . . [Neither] the State, nor any of its citizens, has the right 
to kill someone that way.”—Amanda Morgan, Office of Bill Morrow, 
California State Senator80 
Twenty-three of the fifty-five bills are based directly on a version of the NRLC’s Model 
Act and are being proposed and actively supported by affiliated state Right to Life 
organizations, Americans United For Life, and other groups whose primary long-standing 
commitment has centered on criminalizing abortion.81 
79 Letter from Daniel L. Hooker, Assemblyman, New York Legislative District 127, to Joshua E. Perry 
(June 8, 2006) (on file with author).  Assemblyman Hooker was responding to an inquiry about why he 
proposed Assembly Bills 7911 and 7912, bills that, respectively, would require a jury trial if the surrogate 
decision maker advocated on behalf of an outcome “intended to result in the death” of the patient and 
would create a presumption that a patient would desire ANH if necessary to sustain life.  Accord letter from 
Serphin R. Maltese, Senator, New York Queens County, to Joshua E. Perry (June 19, 2006) (on file with 
author) (“This bill [S.4083] was introduced as a reaction to the controversy surrounding the death of Ms. 
Terri Schiavo. . . . Providing food and water to a patient is part of the basic care of a patient and by no 
means should be defined as an extraordinary measure to extend a life.  Ordinary daily use of feeding tubes 
is basic care that does not require medical supervision.  Death by starvation and dehydration is a long 
grueling process.  Before a patient is subjected to such a death there should be no doubt as to the patient’s 
wishes regarding the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration.”).  See also Maya Bell, Debate About 
How We Die Rages On, But Chasm Grows, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 26, 2006) (quoting Margie 
Montgomery, executive director of the Kentucky Right to Life Association: “The Supreme Court was 
wrong when it ruled in the Dred Scott decision that black people were not legally people . . . and they were 
wrong in Cruzan. Food and water is not medical treatment.  It is basic care.  You don’t starve a dog to 
death, much less a human being.”). 
80 E-mail from Amanda Morgan, Office of Senator Bill Morrow, California Senate District 38, to Joshua E. 
Perry (June 13, 2006) (on file with author).  Ms. Morgan was responding to an inquiry about why Senator 
Morrow proposed Senate Bill 1280, “The Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities 
Prevention Act.” 
81 For instance, in California, Senator Morrow’s legislation is being pushed by the following groups, inter 
alia: Americans United for Life; California Pro-Life Council; Concerned Women for America; and the 
Terri Schindler-Schiavo Foundation, Center for Healthcare Ethics.  See e-mail from Amanda Morgan, 
Office of Senator Bill Morrow, California Senate District 38, to Joshua E. Perry (June 13, 2006) (on file 
with author).  Accord e-mail from Dwayne Alons, Representative, Iowa House District 4, to Joshua E. 
Perry (July 2, 2006) (on file with author) (“The groups supporting HSB 302 would be the National Right to 
Life and other pro-life groups.”)  Representative Alons was responding to an inquiry about why he 
proposed HSB 302, “The Iowa Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act.” 
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The NRLC Model Act creates a presumption that every person incompetent to 
make decisions affecting medical treatment desires artificial nutrition and hydration 
(ANH) “to a degree that is sufficient to sustain life.”82 In a dramatic shift from settled 
legal precedent and most state statutes, the Model Act would prevent the patient’s 
guardian, surrogate, or any other person, as well as any agency or court, from making a 
decision to withhold or withdraw ANH except in two narrow circumstances.83 First, the 
presumption is in applicable if ANH would not contribute to the sustenance of the 
patient’s life or the provision of comfort.84 In other words, if ANH will not prolong the 
patient’s biological life or provide palliation, it can be discontinued.  The second 
circumstance in which the presumption does not apply is if the patient has executed an 
advance directive specifically authorizing the withholding or withdrawal of ANH, “to the 
extent the authorization applies.”85 For enforcement, the Model Act creates a cause of 
action for injunctive relief to stop withdrawal of ANH in violation of the Model Act’s 
provisions or to initiate legal proceedings to determine whether there is clear and 
convincing evidence of express and informed consent to withdrawal of ANH “in the 
applicable circumstances.”86 
I emphasize the terms “to the extent authorization applies” and “in the applicable 
circumstances” for two reasons.  First, it should be noted that these patently ambiguous 
phrases could easily become silly putty in the hands of a crafty and creative lawyer.  If 
 
82 NRLC Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act (Revised January 
2006) [NRLC Model Act] § 3(A) (on file with author and available at www.nrlc.org).   
83 NRLC Model Act § 3(B) (on file with author).  My analysis of the Model Act is limited to the revised 
version current as of January 2006.  The original version introduced in October 2003 was the basis for 
much of the NRLC-derived legislation introduced prior to January 2006.  Detailed discussion of the earlier 
version can be found in JON B. EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S CONSPIRACY TO TAKE 
AWAY OUR RIGHTS 219-225 (2005). 
84 NRLC Model Act § 4(A) (on file with author). 
85 NRLC Model Act § 4(B) (emphasis added) (on file with author). 
86 NRLC Model Act § 5(A) (emphasis added) (on file with author). 
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any of the enumerated persons with standing87 object to the withdrawal of ANH, all they 
must do is secure a lawyer who is willing to argue that in the particular and precise 
circumstances at hand, the authorization set forth in the advanced directive does not 
apply.  Considering the infinite variety of circumstances in which a patient might become 
incapacitated and reliant upon ANH, it would be impossible for an advanced directive to 
be drafted in such a way as to prevent a legal challenge.  Moreover the legislation 
elevates the importance of the written advance directive—a document that only a small 
percentage of the population has executed88—to a degree that even oral testimony by the 
patient’s surrogate relating conversations with the patient or detailed descriptions of the 
patient’s life experiences would probably fail to meet the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard demanded by the Model Act. 
The second reason we must pause and contemplate the italicized phrases are 
because they highlight an important biopolitical dynamic between the sovereign (or the 
one in power) and the notion of legal exception.89 Quoting Carl Schmitt at length, 
Agamben notes that “[t]he exception explains the general and itself.  And when one 
really wants to study the general, one need only look around for a real exception.  It 
brings everything to light more clearly than the general itself.”90 In the juridico-political 
 
87 Legal action may be brought by: the patient’s spouse, parent, child or sibling; the patient’s current or 
former health care provider; the patient’s legally appointed guardian; a state protection or advocacy agency; 
or, a public official with appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute or enforce state law.  See NRLC Model Act § 
5(B)(a)-(e).  Note that the Model Act does not rank or prioritize these parties.  A state governor or agency 
director is granted the same power to bring legal action to block removal of a feeding tube as the patient’s 
spouse, parent, or children.  
88 The most recent survey reveals that a mere 29% of Americans have a living will. “More Americans 
Discussing and Planning End-of-Life Treatment.”  The Pew Research Center for the People and The Press.  
Jan. 5, 2006. 
89 See Agamben for further discussion of Carl Schmitt and the notion that “the sovereign is he who decides 
on the state of exception.”  See AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 11, 15. 
90 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 16.  See also Giorgio Agamben, The State of Exception, in POLITICS,
METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH at 284ff.  My use of “legal exception” differs from Agamben’s notion of the 
“state of exception” concept, which is best exemplified in those moments when the sovereign sets apart a 
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order, the legal exceptions mark the boundaries of individual freedom and state power.  
These exceptions are what trigger litigation.  These exceptions are where the action and 
the power are located.  The fact that the Model Act wraps the legal exceptions to its 
presumption in such ambiguous language as “to the extent the authorization applies” and 
“in the applicable circumstances” highlights the divestment of power from the individual 
and her surrogate to anyone who willing to assume and assert the power granted by the 
Model Act. 
Indeed, as written, the NRLC Model Act empowers a relatively broad array of 
individuals and state actors to intervene in an incompetent patient’s end-of-life medical 
treatment and fight to continue ANH regardless of the incompetent patient’s desires—
unless the patient is among that 29% of the country with an advanced written directive 
and the advanced directive is able to withstand the legal scrutiny invited by the italicized 
language of exception.  Again, as set forth in the Model Act, operation of the exceptions 
to the presumption in favor of indefinitely continuing ANH will turn ultimately on the 
interpretation of the written language in the advanced directive and an analysis of the 
specific circumstances surrounding the patient’s incompetency.  This invites an 
unacceptable degree of juridico-political intervention and control at the bedside of a 
patient who is confronting the end of her life.   
Thus, for instance, if we consider the outcome of the Schiavo case, which 
prompted the NRLC to draft the Model Act and many of the elected officials throughout 
the U.S. to propose various bills that would restrict an incompetent patient’s freedom to 
discontinue ANH, it becomes clear that under the regime envisioned by the Model Act, 
 
time and place where the very rule of law can be suspended in the (alleged) best interests of the nation, i.e., 
Nazi concentration camps and Guantanamo Bay.     
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Mrs. Schiavo would still be receiving ANH.  She did not have an advanced directive, and 
despite recollections of her husband and other close friends and family members 
regarding her wishes and the entire arc of her life91, her situation would not qualify as an 
exception has designated by the Model Act.  Thus, in Agamben’s terms, the Model Act 
creates an environment in which biological life—maintained by the intervention of 
ANH—becomes completely divorced from the form of life that was Terri Schiavo.92 
In the absence of the Model Act, the current legal regime throughout most of the 
country respects the decision of a proxy made on behalf of the incapacitated patient.  In 
most instances, the settled legal consensus respecting patient autonomy accommodates 
individual, personalized decision-making by a proxy that is consistent with the life lived 
and beliefs held by the patient before entering into the final silence of the persistent 
vegetative state.  If specific statements or the totality of an incompetent patient’s life can 
somehow establish a clear preference for indefinite continuation of treatment with 
artificial nutrition and hydration, I am willing to entertain the possibility that the law 
should afford such a patient the final liberty to pursue such a preference.  Indeed, such is 
the breadth of options currently provided under the legal status quo.  Regardless of what 
decision is desired—to continue ANH or to withdraw—the current flexibility of most 
state laws affords respect and dignity to the individual.    
As threatened by the Model Act, however, the state’s power to regulate and 
control the death and dying process93 of all its incapacitated citizens would supersede the 
 
91 See generally ROGER DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 216, 224 (1994) (defending the notion that individual autonomy must include the 
power to make “the most central, personality-defining judgments about their own lives for themselves” and 
to shape the overall kind of life the individual wants to have led and arguing against the imposition of 
collective judgment on “matters of the most profound spiritual character”).  
92 AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 186. 
93 See discussion infra Part I(A). 
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potentially contrary desires of those patients who, perhaps because they are in a persistent 
vegetative state, would not desire continuing ANH.  Such a scenario would allow 
biological life—the body94—to become a (bio)political tool for the use of those seeking 
to advance biopolitical agenda of control across other medico-legal domains.  It is to this 
wider consideration that we will now turn.               
Part III. Proxy wars 
 Writing on the first anniversary of Terri Schiavo’s death, columnist Ellen 
Goodman noted that “since Schiavo’s death, conservative groups have filed 49 bills in 23 
state legislatures seeking laws that would leave any patient without a living will—such as 
Terri—on life support.”95 But then she noted that most of this proposed legislation was 
either dead, stalled, or watered down, which prompted her to muse rhetorically, “[W]hat 
if they gave a culture war and nobody came?”96 In this third Part, I will argue that when 
viewed through the theoretical lens of biopolitics, the post-Schiavo legislation must be 
taken more seriously than Goodman’s dismissive culture war query suggests.  Staying 
with the military metaphors and building upon Alta Charo’s insightful phraseology, I will 
argue that the post-Schiavo end-of-life legislation represents a proxy war in the ongoing 
cultural battles over the social frontiers of biologic, nonsentient human life.   
 Ultimately at stake in this biopolitical proxy war are the boundaries of 
government regulation and the limits of individual freedom.  Here there is a tension.  On 
this point, Professor Parry observes, “biopolitics simply reflects the enlightenment project 
 
94 “Like the concepts of sex and sexuality, the concept of the “body” too is always already caught in the 
deployment of power.  The “body” is always already a biopolitical body . . .” AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, at 
187. 
95 Ellen Goodman, Schiavo Debate is Back But Life’s Moved On, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2006, at 
A15.   
96 Ellen Goodman, Schiavo Debate is Back But Life’s Moved On, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2006, at 
A15 
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of promoting reason . . . Social structures have become rationalized, so that governments 
are more likely to operate by articulated policy instead of fiat, the rule of law instead of 
whim, and democracy instead of hereditary rule or warlordism.”97 Thus as rational, 
rights-bearing individuals go about crafting the public policies and rules of law—
particularly with regard to issues of the body—the cultural battlefield emerges.  
Ideological fights erupt between competing understandings of complex concepts, such as 
human dignity, life’s sanctity, the common good, and the individual’s flourishing—even 
unto death.  I suggest that the Terri Schiavo drama and the wave of legislative action that 
has been created in its wake must be seen in these biopolitical terms.  Furthermore, 
regardless of the ultimate success of the Model Act and its progeny, viewing these 
legislative developments through the lens of biopolitics prevents us from merely 
shrugging-off these proposals as blips on the radar unworthy of our attention and 
analysis.        
 Kathryn Hinsch, founding director of the progressive Women’s Bioethics Project, 
understands the bigger picture represented by the proposed ANH laws.  She has recently 
noted that “conservative religious groups have devoted substantial resources to affecting 
bioethics public policy.”98 She argues: 
 
97 Parry, “Society”, at 877.  But note that in his conclusion, Parry seems to be slightly more ambivalent than 
I on the question of whether the modern, centralized biopolitical state is a threat to individual liberties 
about which we should be concerned.  He notes that the process by which particular freedoms are defined, 
managed, and subjected to suspension is a process that “leads not only to centralization and state violence 
but also to rights that channel the exercise of state power, to pervasive regulation of our lives and 
environment but also to a significant amount of predictability and security for many people.”  Id. at 877.    
98 Kathryn Hinsch, Remarks at the Center for American Progress Special Presentation on “Bioethics and 
Politics: Past, Present, and Future,” (Apr. 21, 2006) (transcript on file with author and available at 
www.americanprogress.org).  See also Joshua E. Perry, Biblical BioPolitics: Judicial Process, Religious 
Rhetoric, Terri Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 2:553-650 (2006) (discussing the activities of 
Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, American Center for Law & Justice, and Southern Baptist 
Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty Council), JON B. EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS 
RIGHT’S CONSPIRACY TO TAKE AWAY OUR RIGHTS 94-109 (2005) (detailing the interconnected money 
trail, political links, and think-tank machinery that supported Terri Schiavo’s parents throughout their battle 
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Strategically, conservatives have seized on bioethics as a way to build the 
society based on their values and their worldview, which I would argue is 
anti-science, pro-religion, anti-reproductive freedom, by aggressively 
framing how bioethical issues are considered.  But just as importantly, 
there are important tactical implications.  They’re using it as a way to gear 
up their troops, to galvanize their base, to polish their image as protector’s 
of society’s values, and perhaps most importantly to divide progressives.99 
The national reputation of the Right to Life Committee and its state-based confederation 
of local advocacy organizations is well known.  Among the lower profile conservative 
groups that Hinsch identifies is Americans United for Life (AUL).   
AUL is an organization founded in 1971 that has “made a transition from 
previously a well established, well funded, pro-life law firm that was solely dedicated to 
overturning Roe v. Wade to one that encompasses a broader range of bioethical issues 
from embryo research, cloning, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology.”100 Indeed, in 
March 2006, AUL, which has an annual budget of $1.4 million, released the 520-page 
Defending Life 2006: A State-by-State Legal Guide to Abortion, Bioethics, and End of 
Life.101 In short, this public policy manual is an exquisitely detailed battle plan for 
crafting incremental legislation that will result in a “pro-life America.”102 AUL promotes 
itself as “the nation’s foremost legal organization” working “hand in hand every day with 
state legislators, policy makers, and activists, helping pass laws” that “promote a culture 
 
to block withdrawal of Mrs. Schiavo’s ANH), and R. Alta Charo, Passing on the Right: Conservative 
Bioethics is Closer Than It Appears, 32 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 307 (2004) (discussing the 
President’s Council on Bioethics and its many political connections to religiously and politically 
conservative organizations). 
99 Kathryn Hinsch, Remarks at the Center for American Progress Special Presentation on “Bioethics and 
Politics: Past, Present, and Future,” (Apr. 21, 2006) (transcript on file with author and available at 
www.americanprogress.org).   
100 Kathryn Hinsch, Remarks at the Center for American Progress Special Presentation on “Bioethics and 
Politics: Past, Present, and Future,” (Apr. 21, 2006) (transcript on file with author and available at 
www.americanprogress.org).   
101 DEFENDING LIFE 2006: A STATE-BY-STATE LEGAL GUIDE TO ABORTION, BIOETHICS, AND END OF LIFE 
[DEFENDING LIFE 2006] (Americans United for Life ed., 2006) (on file with author and available at 
www.AUL.org/defending_life).   
102 DEFENDING LIFE 2006 at 5. 
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of life through the law.”103 The editor of Defending Life 2006 boasts that “state by state 
and law by law” AUL is “winning the battle to create a culture of life and to protect all 
human life from its earliest stages until its natural end.”104 
While the AUL’s “culture of life” agenda includes the advancement of legislation 
similar to the NRLC’s Model Act, opposition to experimentation on embryos, prenatal 
genetic screening, cloning, and assisted suicide, “its roots are in the abortion fight.”105 
Thus despite a recently expanded bioethical scope, AUL’s thirty year history has been 
focused on developing “a proven strategy to significantly reduce abortions . . . to create 
effective legal precedent that will lead to overturning Roe v. Wade, and to prepare for the 
. . . legal battles that will follow Roe’s reversal.”106 The ultimate fight, therefore, is about 
eradicating abortion and regulating women’s bodies.  To the extent that embryonic stem 
cell research or feeding tubes can be parlayed into a cause that will nudge the political 
climate in a direction that is more hospitable to a reversal of Roe, AUL is shrewdly 
prepared to fight its anti-abortion battle along these alternative, or proxy, culture war 
fronts.107 Alta Charo analyzes the situation in these terms: 
Finally, there is the awesome scale and scope of the abortion wars.  In the 
absence of legislative options for outright prohibition, abortion opponents 
search for proxy wars, using debates on research involving human 
embryos, the donation of organs from anencephalic neonates, and the right 
of persons in a persistent vegetative state to die as opportunities to 
rehearse arguments on the value of biologic but nonsentient human 
existence.108 
103 DEFENDING LIFE 2006 at 519. 
104 DEFENDING LIFE 2006 at 9. 
105 Jeanne Cummings, Targeting Roe:  In Abortion Fight, Little-Known Group Has Guiding Hand, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 30, 2005) at A1. 
106 DEFENDING LIFE 2006 at 5. 
107 Ian Berry, Schiavo’s Parents Relate Ordeal at Local Baptist Church, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS 
(Oct. 4, 2005) at B1 (quoting Joshua E. Perry as seeing the drama surrounding Terri Schiavo as “another 
event in the ongoing culture wars.”).  
108 R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2471, 2472 (2005). 
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Supporters of the Model Act legislation might counter that of course there is a 
consistency between defending biologic nonsentient human life from conception all the 
way through to death.  However, given the large numbers of feeding tubes withdrawn 
from incapacitated patients every year, one is left to wonder why the last fifteen months 
has seen the Schiavo case become the catalyst for the politicization of feeding tubes and 
end-of-life care at the bedside.109 Those who would defend the Model Act and seek to 
dismiss the proxy war thesis must explain why long-term opponents of abortion have 
chosen Terri Schiavo and this particular historical moment to expand the scope of their 
biopolitical agenda to include the regulation of ANH.   
Although the post-Schiavo movement to amend state laws and public policies 
regulating the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration to incompetent patients has 
not yet met with much legislative success, the biopolitical ethos of our day will 
undoubtedly continue to produce proxy wars in furtherance of a “culture of life” agenda.  
In the concluding remarks that follow, we will briefly consider the normative problems 
created by such an agenda of control in our age of biopolitics.    
Conclusion 
 Commenting on the political interventions during Mrs. Schiavo’s final weeks of 
life, George Annas noted President George W. Bush’s repeated use of the phrase “culture 
of life” and its “not-terribly-subtle reference to the antiabortion movement in the United 
 
109 According to Steve Miles’s research, two million deaths occur every year in medical settings, and 85 to 
95 percent of those are preceded by decisions to withhold or terminate life-prolonging interventions.  
Denise Grady, Medical and Ethical Questions Raised on Deaths of Critically Ill Patients, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A18.  See also E-mail from Steve Miles to Joshua E. Perry (July 20, 2006) (on file 
with author). 
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States.”110 Annas argued that “culture of life” politics is problematic at the bedside 
because it threatens to violate “a person’s body and human dignity in a way few would 
want for themselves.111 Instead of “erring on the side of life,” Annas argues that 
American values and constitutional traditions dictate that we err on the side of liberty and 
defend the patient’s right to decide on treatment.112 
The push to change ANH laws in response to the Terri Schiavo tragedy appears to 
be, ultimately, about the biopolitical regulation of an incompetent patient’s death and the 
advancement of an anti-abortion agenda.  Because the withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration is often an emotionally profound and often painful act undertaken by those 
entrusted to care for the patient, biopolitics has no place at the patient’s bedside.  By this 
I mean that regulatory intervention that, in the absence of a sufficiently authorized and 
applicable living will, presumes to dictate the means and manner in which the bodies of 
incompetent individuals must be treated vis-à-vis the removal of life-prolonging 
technology is a biopolitics that is inconsistent with our best traditions of liberty and self-
determination.   
 The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized this discussion in terms of the right to 
bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching.113 The very notion of individual 
rights, however, is only triggered by the assumption that a rational public interest in 
preserving life validates the regulation of an individual’s choice to receive ANH at the 
end of life.  And so, we can clearly see that a tension exists between the private 
individual and that segment of the community advocating a “culture of nonsentient 
 
110 George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside—The Case of Terri Schiavo [“Culture of 
Life”], 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1710-15 (2005). 
111 Annas, Culture of Life, at 1714. 
112 Annas, Culture of Life, at 1714. 
113 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990). 
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human existence.”  We should expect this tension to emerge again in future proxy wars, 
as biopolitical actors (of all ideological stripes) stand ready to push new laws that assert 
“strategies for the governing of life”114 and the state’s biopower “to make live and to let 
die.”115 At the bedside, in our most emotionally vulnerable moments, the premeditated 
use of such power—in the form of regulations and legislation designed to advance a 
grander culture of control objective relating to abortion politics—is an abuse that we 
must both recognize and resist.          
 
114 Rabinow & Rose, Biopower Today, at 195-217. 
115 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, at 241. 
